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THE claims of Sociology ' as such ' to be recognised a« an
accredited science are being advanced at the present tnno
with an energy and an assurance worthy of its eponymous
' Founder '. Is it really a science, or is it more than a name
for a science which may or may not some day come into
existence ? Prof. Giddings has no misgivings : he is com-
pelled to acknowledge that Sociology has so far been a
substance of scientific things hoped for rather than realised,
but he assures us that " there is every reason to believe that
the time has come when its principles, accurately formulated
and adequately verified, can be organised into a coherent
10
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146 8TDNBT BALL:
theory " ; when, in other words, Sociology may be exhibited
as " a definite and concrete body of knowledge to be presented
in the class-room and worked over in the seminarium ".
These are brave and even startling words, and they certainly
merit the attention of social students. Whether Prof.
Gidding's own treatise, in its larger or smaller form, confirms
the expectation which he raises, I do not propose to inquire
in detail. I cannot think, however, that it is specially
adapted to remove the deep-seated suspicion of the layman
that Sociology is rather a word which denotes a great group
of problems waiting for solution than any compact and
systematic body of doctrine, and that, as Prof. Wallace puts
it, " works with the title of Sociology are rather essays to
find the handle of a science than real exhibitions of its
systematic content ". Certainly, if one applies Comte's
own tests of the real establishment of a positive science to
the ' Sociology ' that exists,—the tests, that is, of Consensus
and Continuity (to say nothing of Prevision), the results are
discouraging and even bewildering. Prof. GiddingB insists
that Sociology has a province " as definite as that of any
science " : the realisation of its logical possibilities, he tells
us, is " at least a little nearer than it was when Mr. Spencer
wrote his awakening chapter on ' Our Need of I t ' " . But
to the student of current sociological literature there seems
to be a conspicuous absence of agreement as to the principles,
province, or method of the science; while the predictions
of sociologists carry disagreement to the verge of incompati-
bility. Quot homines, tot sociologies : Vanni distinguishes and
criticises at least ten different, if not disparate, definitions of
Sociology, and Barth treats Prof. Giddings' Principles as one
among many samples of ' dualistic Sociology,' which is in
its turn one among many species of sociological systems.
Barth himself (who may be regarded as the first systematic
historian of the subject) identifies Sociology with the philo-
sophy of history, and is therefore of opinion that Prof.
Giddings and other sociologists have missed the royal road
of the historical method. Apart from the merits of his own
philosophy of history, Barth seems to be in thiR respect truer
to the original Sociological tradition ; for it is not a little
remarkable that the prevalent method of Sociology should
have become psychological, in view of the fact that the
founder of Sociology as a ' positive ' science expressly ex-
cluded psychology from its method. The distinctively
Comtist note is, indeed, difficult to find in modern Sociology,
which is at once psychological, abstract, and theoretical.
The only element in the original conception that seems to
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be left is the formal recognition of Sociology as a positive
soienoe, having for its subject-matter the study of social
phenomena as a whole: formal, because Comte'sl hypothesis
that social phenomena are subject to natural lawB, admitting
of rational prevision, seems to suggest both more and less
than what is attempted by the modern sociologist as such.
The change that nas come over the conception and method
of the science gives to Dr. Alengry*s review of the Comtist
Sociology a somewhat antiquated air. Dr. Alengry seems to
accept the view that Comte has endowed Sociology with its
principal means of existence in his conception of "da* lot*
ndoessaires et propnment tociologiques, ddcovoerte* par MM mAkode
tpioiaie: I'hittoin ". These are de$ germet vmperiuabUa q%e la
Sooiolgie aprit JIM ailait bientdt fioonder. Dr. Alengry assumes,
in effect; that progress in Sociology must be progress on the
lines laid down by Comte, and contents himself with criti-
cising Comte in the light, not of any change that has come
over the method, but of the method Comte himself prescribed.
Comte, we are told, has given undue prominence to the lawB
of succession of social phenomena as compared with the laws
of their co-existence : nis historical canvas is too large, and
he has neglected the comparative and statistical method.
Still, Comte's method (we are given to understand) has only
to be modified and corrected to be effective: Comte, in effect,
' discovered' the fundamental principles of social science;
he definitely annexed le rigne social to ' the realm of nature,'
and the rest is simply a matter of detail. Dr. Alengry, from
the Pisgah-height of Comte's achievement, ventures even to
survey the promised land, and looks forward to the establish-
ment of a social science which shall be to statesmen what
astronomy is to pilots or physiology to doctors (p. 496). But
he seems unaware that Sociology has become a psycho-
logical science,* and that its statements are being more and
more confined to the indicative mood. The value of his
study, accordingly, consists entirely in the light it throws
upon the evolution, not of Sociology, but of Comte's idea of
it: and for this purpose Dr. Alengry has drawn largely upon
Comte's private correspondence. He has also made some
attempt—certainly not a particularly instructive attempt—
to affiliate Comte to previous thought: but he has not taken
1
 Cp. D y i dea loisaosai dAterminees pour le diveloppement de l'eapcce
hamaine que pour la ohute d'une pierre (Corretp. avee Valat, p. 189).
•Aa Mill intended: but, according to Dr. Alengry, Mill haa added
nnthlng to the ' thought of the master': in (act, so far from fortifying or
completing the conception of social law, he has really enfeebled it
(pp 480, 491).
 at U
niversity of California, San D
iego on June 4, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
148 8YDNBY BALL:
him as far back as the Seventh Book of the Bepublic of
Plato: and yet Plato is certainly entitled to no uncertain
place among let prdcwBeurs of Comte, though Comte himself,
I believe, did not carry hie direct lineage back beyond I'in-
comparable Arittote.
Although Comte's theory has in its broad features lost
nothing of its impressiveness, and although there are many
valuable elements in his historical and social theories which
no sociologist can afford to neglect, it cannot be said that
Dr. Alengry has succeeded in that part of his task which
consisted in defining Comte's exact place in the history of
Sociology. ' Back to Comte' will hardly commend itself as
a rallying cry for latter-day sociologists. What was fruitful
in Comte—more particularly his idea of continuity—has
become part of a common intellectual heritage; but there
are no signs that he is in any marked way a direct or primary
influence in sociological study.
The same may be said of Mr. Spencer, in spite of the
handsome testimonial he gets from Prof. Giddings. The
one thing that is common to the Sociology that prevails is
its emphatic rejection of the biological method To Prof.
Giddings, as to Prof. Baldwin, society most be construed,
not as an organism, but as a psychological organisation.
In this respect American Sociologists join hands with their
French, and, if we may believe M. Bougie {Let Sciences
societies en Allenagne), their German confreres.
There is both loss and gain in this development. The
' crude application of biological conceptions and" methods to
•social facts was bound to .provoke a re-action ; but the signi-
ficance of the organic analogy, and of the whole group of
ideas of which it formed a part, is not yet exhausted. As
Mr. Bosanquet puts it, in his masterly survey of sociological
points of view, " it has made us sensitive to the continuity of
things and therefore also to their unity. . . . The ' return
to nature,' and the ' noble savage,' have been invested with
a significance which can never be forgotten, and which
criticism can never set aside." Moreover, the ideas of selection
and of the struggle for existence have been, and are capable
of being still further, applied to the theory of social progress
with genuine appropriateness and significance. The analogy,
if properly used,1 suggests in a very important way the
general conditions upon which the maintenance of human
1
 That even those who see least in the biological analogy are liable to
be unduly influenced by its associations may be seen in Prof. Baldwin's
principle of ' social heredity '. It is clear that ' heredity' cannot strictly
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life depends. To quote Mr. Bosanquet again, " the study of
parasitism and regressive selection will continue to be a
warning against the attempt to emancipate mankind from
the sterner general conditions of the cosmic order". The
tendency to repudiate the biological ' source' of sociological
science, seems likely to end in simply replacing one abstrac-
tion by another. It is too often forgotten that an abstraction
may represent a genuine side of reality, even if it is not the
whole of it, and there is a real danger as well as loss incurred
iu any neglect of the fruitful interaction between the science
of society and the general science of life. The loss is not
only on the side of social science It is natural to regard the
science of life as the greatest creditor in the relation ; but it
io, perhaps, even more important to remember that the moral
sciences, so far from being " dependent on the general laws
of evolution," supply most important data for the theory of
• evolution' itself; and this consideration alone should be
decisive against the claims of biological science to absorb the
science of ethics. Ethics cannot be absorbed by a science of
natural fact without ceasing to be ethical science: on the
other hand, a science of evolution which has to include
human and social life cannot stop at the formulation of
phases characteristic of lower kinds of fact. It would seem
as if in the immediate future the theory of evolution is
likely to gain more from sciences which deal with human
life and product than vice versd. Any how, the relative in-
dependence of ethical science is as imperatively demanded in
the interest of " the philosophy of Evolution," as in that of
ethical science itself. On the other hand, it was quite time
that the sufficiency of the biological method should be
challenged. The biological ideas that have penetrated or
permeated ethical theory have not only not revolutionised
the science, but have not made any definitely original contri-
bution to results. The effect has been, for the most part,
to reinforce old truths by giving them all the significance
and confirmation they can derive from being stated in terms
of, and in relation to, distinctively modern experience, in the
widest sense. All that is essential ia the idea of ' the social
organism,' had already been stated by Plato and Aristotle:
the analogy goes further in modern life in proportion as our
experience of both terms is wider and deeper : but the Greek
thinkers had at least the advantage of not being overwhelmed
be applied to the process of individual 'acquisition' or 'personal adapta-
tion '. Cp., the same writer's attempted classification of the various sorts
of 'Selection' (App. B).
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by the influence of what Mr. Boaanqnet terms " the sciences
of the lower life ": they were under no temptation to ' ex-
plain ' the higher by the lower.
The claim of Sociology to absorb not only ethics, but
political economy and other branches of social -investigation
is even less justified by results. 80 far as Sociology is
governed by the ideal of an exact science, it may be truly
affirmed that economics is the only sphere in which the
mathematical ideal has been in any degree realised: while
the best sociological work has been done by investigators
who have been quite unconscious of general sociological
purpose or method. It is at least doubtful whether the kind
of problems that seem to peculiarly belong to Sociology are
likely to be advanced by sociologists " as such " : much that
passes for Sociology in general seems to be mainly an exercise
m terminology, and it is always easier to use terminology
than to be scientific.
That there is, however, a general science of social pheno-
mena, or a science of sociology as such, is an assumption
that has been revived in an emphatic manner in modern
thought. Contemporary sociologists have exerted themselves
to discover an organon for the science ; or in other words to
find the ultimate social fact to which the complexity of
social phenomena can be logically or ultimately reduced. The
ultimate social fact is to most of these writers some character-
istic of consciousness—in a word, some fact of mind. In a
passage which might have been borrowed from Plato, Prof.
Baldwin observes that " the progress of society is, in its
method, id its direction, and in its impelling motives,
analogous to the growth of consciousness rather than to
that of the biological organism ". It has become, in fact,
almost a settled maxim that the true method of sociological
study is psychological, and its unit of measurement " some
original and" elementary subjective fact". Now, there are
many things that may be said about the method that is thus
suggested.
In the first place, we may well ask what it is precisely
that psychological sociologists are trying to explain : for
most of the theories in question are theories rather of
association or of contact between individuals, than of society
as such, or of society organised as a State. " Consciousness
of kind," or like-mindedness for instance, according to Prof.
Giddings, fulfils the sociological requirement: it is co-exten-
sive with potential society and with nothing else. But it is
clear that the mere recognition of another being as of ' like
kind' with oneself, even if it could by itself explain associa-
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COBBENT SOCIOLOGY. 1 6 1
tion, could not explain the difference between mere associa-
tion1 and a society or State,'both of which involve a good deal
more than a consciousness of kind, the consciousness, for
instance, of membership in a social or political whole. In
fact, it may be affirmed of Prof. Giddings' first principle,
what he himself says of the principle of ' Imitation ' : there
may be consciousness of kind, just as there may be Imitation,
which has in it no germ whatever of society, still less of the
forces which hold together the body politic. Consciousness
of kind would not account for the existence of a State—either
for the forces which bring it into being, or the forces which
maintain it in being: it would not account for social variation
or progress: it does not in itself contain any standard or
criterion which could be applied to the valuation of different
forms or degrees of ' community'.
To M. Tarde, who is in many ways the most typical re-
presentative of the psychological method, the ultimate social
fact is ' Imitation'. To this theory as stated by M. Tarde
Prof. Baldwin objects, that it is void of content. Imitation
is the means, but what is it that is imitated ? ' M. Tarde
would reply {La Logique sociale)—' beliefs and -desires : ' Prof.
Baldwin says 'thoughts'. But, apart from the ' matter,' is
it true that Imitation is the ' method' of social organisa-
tion, and if so, in what sense ? The answer is a little difficult
on account of the extended meaning which is given to ' Imita-
tion,' especially by Prof. Baldwin, with whom Imitation seems
to stand for any form or degree of mental appropriation or
assimilation. Any how, it would seem that the process of
social organisation is not one of ' imitation ' (in any essential
sense) at all, but of adjustment of members in and to a social
whole.
Whatever may have been the shortcomings of biological
sociologists, they were at least aware of the difference be-
tween a mere juxtaposition of individuals, and that kind of
co-operative structure we call a society: and it is just the
idea of the social organism that imitation between individuals
—whatever that may exactly mean—does not so much as
even suggest.
Bagehot has already called attention to the social operation
of Imitation, but he did not go on to represent it a3 the nerve
of social organisation. It is noticeable that Prof. Baldwin,
in his new Preface, sums up the position common to Bagehot,
1
 It conld hardly explain an association formed for any particular par-
pose, snob an association being generated and maintained by something
loore than consciousness of kind. By itself, the principle could only
explain gregariousneM.
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Tarde and himself, in the principle that imitation is che
method of social ' propagation'—which is not the same thing
as ' organisation ' ; and his criticism of M. Tarde turns upon
the distinction between social ' matter' and social 'process,'
i.e., "between propagation and that which is propagated,
between mere imitation and social progress ". But this does
not prevent him from describing the ' process' as essenti-
ally a process of Imitation. Prof. Baldwin's account of the
' sources' of the theory is not a little interesting. The prin-
ciple that Imitation is " the fundamental social fact," is, we
are told, an ' intuition' on the part of M. Tarde, quite independ-
ent of a like intuition on the part of Mr Bagehot, which Prof
Baldwin in turn has established independently by genetic
psychology; by the discovery, that is, that'the fundamental
social fact is only a development of the fundamental psycho-
logical fact. The combined result of these independent
Kources of the Imitation theory might seem to constitute a
strong presumption in its favour: but when it appears upon
closer inspection that the same word covers a considerable
variety of meaning and application, our confidence is some-
what shaken : it seems to suggest that the vogue which the
theory has obtained is due to the vagueness rather than the
precision of the conception itself. All that the formula
itself conveys is that a good deal of ' copying' goes on in
social life, or that much of what goes to make society is due
to the influence of mind on mind. This is such an obvious
fact that it may well have escaped formulation . what is it,
then, that has given to a familiar phenomenon such a range
and depth of significance '>
In the case of Bagehot and M. Tarde, it has really been
suggested by the idea of the extension of scientific ideas and
analogies to social phenomena, and so far it may be regarded
as falling within the sociological tradition as transmitted
by Oointe and Spencer. For this reason I think that Mr.
Bosanquet has perhaps made rather too much of the nemesis
that has overtaken Comte's attitude towards psychology
M Tarde's Sociology is not a psychological science in the
sense in which Comte repudiated such a science. M. Tarde
is a psychological sociologist in the sense that he finds the
ultimate social fact in some relation between minds : but the
way he gets at this conception is by finding an analogue
in social life to the law of Repetition which is characteristic
of all knowable phenomena. M. Tarde is completely domi-
nated by the scientific conception of society: his criticism
of the biological method, for example, is that it is not scientific
enough, jufit l>ecause it is not appropriate to social as dis-
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tinguished from biological facts. The elementary social fact
is ID his view ' imitation between man and man' : this he
conceives has only to be worked out to furnish an analytic
explanation of the "collective " facts of society. Accordingly,
the task of Sociology is to set forth the general laws govern-
ing imitative repetition which are to sociology what the laws
of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation
to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics (Social
Laws, p. 61). In other words, M. Tarde is as much under
the influence of the exact and mathematical ideal of social
science as Comte himself. It was only, says M. Tarde
truly enough, " when the infinitesimal calculus was invented
and men went back to the indecomposable mathematical
element whose continuous repetition explains all, that the
immense fertility of mathematics fully appeared " (p. 60), and
the energy with which M. Tarde enforces the idea of Imita-
tion is motived by the belief, that it has only to be under-
stood and applied to be destined to work a transformation
in Sociology similar to that brought about in mathematics
by the introduction of the infinitesimal calculus. Nothing
is more characteristic of M. Tarde than his protest against
the identification of Sociology with the philosophy of history,
or against the vague generalities that do duty for social
science: it leads him to declare that it "is not Sociology
that Comte founded ". In this connexion, again, his plea
for detail-work in social investigation is particularly char-
acteristic and instructive. That such an ideal, however, is
very far from accomplishment is illustrated by M Tarde's
application of his theory to the Transformations du Pouvoir.
Like all M. Tarde's work, it is suggestive—suggestive net
so much of points of view (which seem rather like old friends
in a new garb) as of lines of research—but also greatly ' in
the air'.
Prof. Baldwin reaches the social principle of Imitation by
a psychological route . what is M. Tarde's point of departure
is Prof. Baldwin's point of arrival. The method he employs
is psychogenetic: it is described as a method which " in-
quires into the psychological development of the human
individual in the earlier stages of growth for light npon his
social nature, and also upon the social organisation in which
he bears a part". It is clear that ' imitation ' is a factor in
the mental development of the individual, but (as already
intimated) what Prof. Baldwin describes as Imitation goes
a good deal beyond the proper or primary import of imitation.
Much that he calls imitation would be more appropriately
described as 'assimilation,' and he sometimes uses it in a
1 1
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sense in which it approaches to the meaning of ' realisation '.
The only reason why Prof. Baldwin makes imitation the
essence of the matter appears to lie in the idea that personal
growth is effected through the play of give-and-take between
individuals. But, according to Prof. Baldwin's own account,
the process is one of individual appropriation rather than of
simple or direct imitation. Certainly, imitation in the strict
sense does not seem to play an important part in the higher
stages of mental development, and as applied to social life
it seems even less significant, for it does not explain that
unity of differences which Plato and Aristotle regarded as
the essence of society. Moreover, the stress laid on the
imitative aspect of the process tends to suggest that the
individual is not born but made social, that his social char-
acter is something superadded through contact with others.
Prof. Baldwin seems in fact embarrassed with his own method
which appears to me to be misleading from the outset. In-
stead of starting with an analysis of the idea of social soli-
darity and all it involves, he endeavours to get it out of tlie
play of imitation between individuals: he tries to find help
for Sociology n psychology rather than vice versd. Here,
again, a valuable hint is given by Plato. Plato also proceeds
on the assumption that the ultimate souioe of social unity
and organisation lies in the individual soul. Justice is an
excellence of the soul: but what is the soul'? Plato answers
in effect that we can only find what the human soul is by
seeing it at work in society. No examination of the in-
dividual soul will give us any definite idea of the characteristic
forces of human nature. We can only discover what human
nature itt by following its realisation in action, by deciphering
its objective expression in all the visible and actual institu-
te,,.-> of social life: for it is only in its outward expression
that the invisible is made manifest. Following this method,
Plato also reaches an ultimate and fundamental psychological
fact; the fact, namely, that the soul has the capacity and is
under the necessity of living a common or co-operative life.
That the State is made up not out of similar, but out of
different individuals, is as axiomatic with Plato as with
Aristotle. We are not surprised, therefore, to find Plato
en.] .asising the double principle of the unity of the whole
And the difference of the parts, while modern sociologists
deprive both the similarities and the differences between
individuals of any social import.
It is this initial fallacy of method that Mr. Bosanquet
drives home in his characteristically incisive way: the error
comes, as he puts it, from working with similarity instead of
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identity, or, again, from working with the notion of society
as simply " self " and " others ". In more than one reference
he points to the difficulties that can be traced to this imper-
fect logic: it underlies the successive failure of Bentham,
Mill, and Spencer to explain the rationale of political self-
government ; law and government being assumed to be
essentially antagonistic to the ' self' of man, as alien, or at
least standing m no positive or vital relation, to human
nature: what social restriction such a theory is forced to
admit is always conceived as essentially a coercion of ' one '
by ' others'. The error is found also to infect current con-
ceptions of psychological Sociology. The mind of a crowd
(rather than that of an army) is taken as the type of a ' true
social mind' (Le Bon): the form of the social process is
analysed into unreal distinctions between ' imitation' and
' invention ' (Tarde and Baldwin): we have two types of law
marked off, one of which corresponds to social similitude,
the other to the social division of labour (Durkheim).
Mr. Bosanquet himself, as the title of his book suggests,
approaches the subject from the philosophical point of view.
The manner in which Mr. Bosanquet corrects the imperfec-
tion attaching to the working conceptions of English polit-
ical philosophy, and by the help of the higher elements in
Kousseau's theory of the general will establishes the true
ground and nature of political obligation in the idea of
' Belf-govemnient,' is sufficient by itself to make The Philo-
sophical Theory of the State a philosophical classic. The
way in which Mr. Bosanquet applies his central idea—the
conception of law and government as representing the higher
self—to the problems of liberty and rights, of State action
and punishment, is equally admirable, even if it does not
add anything essential to Green's Lectures on Political Obli-
gation.
There is one remark, however, that one is tempted to make
in mitigation of the sentence passed upon English political
philosophers, and it will serve to lead up to a more general
observation upon a certain limitation which Mr. Bosanquet's
method imposes upon his treatment of the relation between
the individual and society. Mr. Bosanquet is, of course,
perfectly within his rights as a philosopher in criticising
partial or inadequate points of view, for philosophy demands
wholeness and completeness of view : but then the point of
view of the writers he criticises was not, at any rate explicitly,
philosophical. The real defect of the English publicists is
the defect that attaches to all uncritical treatment of moral
or political questions : they used conceptions which they
 at U
niversity of California, San D
iego on June 4, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
156 SYDNEY BALL:
did not further examine or analyse. It was not so much
that they were bad philosophers as that they were not philo-
sophers in the strict sense at all: they did not have before
them the philosophical problem as such, and the only instru-
ment they use is ' common sense ' stimulated by immediate
practical interests. What they missed in the philosophical,
they made up in the political instinct. After all, ' liberty '
(in a partial and unphilosophical sense, if you like) was to all
these writers a problem of practical politics, and the ' State '
loomed before them in the very palpable form of a suspect
and fallible 'Government'. They move in the region of media
axumata, though they cannot at the same time avoid raising
principles or employing conceptions which are not able to
bear the test of complete theory and, therefore, of complete
practice. Thus, Mr. Spencer's polemic against State-action
really starts from a vivid and abundantly justified sense
of the unwisdom of governmental action : it no doubt leads
him on to principles which cannot survive the scrutiny of
theory . but neither he nor Mill show any signs of being
interested in the theory of 'the State as such. You have
only to scratch the political philosopher in either to find the
political radical. The point, for instance, that would strike
them about Hegel's theory of the State is its suggestion of
political fetichism. The negations of Bentham, Mill, and
Spencer, were the negations that were wanted: that they
do not constitute a true ' theory' of the matter is shown by
their failure to cover the practice of the modern State : but
as Mr Bosanquet admits, their theories (however imperfect
as whole or ultimate statements) when confined to particular
problems often led to sound conclusions—conclusions it may
be added which might not have been so readily derived from
a more ultimate theory. It was not altogether a misfortune
that Bentham was a reformer rather than a philosopher of
law. The English thinkers were not philosophical enough,
it ma\ be freely admitted. they were too much dominated
by the sense of actual evils, and they approached the problems
of lnw and government from a side which gave them a bias
towards the negative conceptions which Mr. Bosanquet weighs
in the balance of a purely theoretic treatment. Generally it
may be said that the tradition in English political thought
is against the detachment of view demanded by philosophy:
it is too deeply rooted in native political instincts to think
abstractly or to study " something as a whole and for its own
sake ". It is perhaps significant that Mr. Bosanquet should
operate throughout with language and conceptions that have
such a foreign and "un-English" look, and at the point where
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we expect iiim to work out Bousseau's theory in termB of our
own political and social' experience Mr. Bosanquet passes on
to trace its development in the political conceptions of Kant)
Fichte and'Hegel; BO that it would seem as if it-was Hegel's
analysis of the State that-Mr. Bosanquet was chiefly interested
in bringing into relation'.with " the actual facts of life ". - It
is a .pity, perhaps, that Mr. Bosanquet gives so little relief to
the abstract character of the argument,, and that he could not
have presented it in a more concrete, or less academic form
The principles which Mr. Bosanquet advocates are < of such
profound value and importance that one cannot help wishing
they could have been translated a little' more freely into the
vernacular—into something nearer to the experience of an
English citizen. We feel that'the^view which Mr. Bosanquet
presents is the only adequate or. ultimate view, and we' must
also acknowledge the luminousness'-as'well. as the power'of
statement with which it is presented."; The whole significance,
indeed, of the Statefor human life'can only be mastered by a
resolute examination of ideas; but Mr. Bosanquet has already
shown us in Aspects of the Social Problem that he has not only
the power of statement that satisfies a philosopher, but also
the power of realising- abstractions, of bringing ultimate
principles into living touch with common experience and the
actual facts of life It is true that part of Mr.* Bosanqu'et's
object in The Philosophical Theory of the State is to emphasise
the significance of its subject-matter to " the general life of
peoples," and to bring out " the greatness and'ideality of "life
in its commonest actual phases " ;• but whether it will seem
to ' palpitate with actuality '-to any one not accustomed to
" thinking obstinately " is, I lfear, very doubtful: 'And1 Here
it must be confessed that Mr 'Bosanquet's attempt to find
confirmation for Hegel's analysis*of- the modern'State in' the
sentiments that operate in the everyday life of an average
citizen or an English labourer, does not altogether meet the
difficulty. No doubt, the "feeling'or insight-which1 con-
stitutes'a consciousness of a common good" are implicifin
the lives of many persons who 'do not• concern themselves
with any such abstract ideas as are expressed by1" the -State"-'
or " the general will ". -;In his anxietyj'however, to'justify the
worth of the State, as such, for the life of man, Mr. Bosanquet
is disposed to lay little stress on the assistance that may be
given to the imagination of th& labourer by efforts of reformers
directed towards making the idea of a State, which exists for
the attainment of a common'good,,more visible and more
palpable than it actually is ; and yet this consideration seems
really as much a part of the argument as the other.' --One
1 1 *
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misses in Mr. Bosanquet's theory of the State such a note as is
struck by a not less distinguished idealist in a passage like
the following :—
" And material civilisation must become the visibility of
the spirit. Instead then of the verbal admission of civility,
that we are all in a way fellow-workers and have in some sort
a common right, what is wanted is the practical carrying out
of that idea in every detail of reality. A community is
civilised in which the solidarity of human effort is the first
and foremost principle, in which citizenship is realised as the
governing, idea of all life. But realised and real it must be,
and not merely acknowledged as a mental principle or in
words and forms. A community is not civilised m which
the subordination of all the materials of civilisation to the
common weal does not receive palpable expression. That is
the point for which the Socialists tight, however much they
may sometimes lose sight of it in side issues."'
The prevailing note of optimism in Mr. Bosanquet's book
is, of course, natural and even necessary ; a purely philoso-
phical method must from the nature of the case make the
most of its object It is really a question of emphasis rather
than of principle: but the general effect of Mr. Bosanquet's
treatment is to suggest that, inasmuch as the idea of a State
is realised wherever there is a State, any particular State is
entitled to rather more than the credit it gets from answer-
ing to the idea of a State at all: which is, indeed, true and
important. But, after all, the State exists for man, and, as
Mr. Bosanquet's theory fully admits, the State is not ultimate
nor above criticism: but the position occupied in political
philosophy by " the analysis of a modern State," inevitably
tends to suggest finality as to the general form of social organi-
sation. The Hegelian theory was found, of course, to admit
of an extreme Left as well as an extreme Bight application :
for if the State has its value in the human capacities which
it is the means of realising; if, as compared with the idea of
humanity, the State or nation is the only effective medium
for the purposes and possibilities of human life; then the
argument cannot stop short at " reverence for the State " ;
and the good man is not simply the good citizen, unless good
citizenship is taken to include an active sense of what ought
to be, but is not. With Socialism as thus understood Mr.
Bosanquet would have no quarrel: the weight of his argu-
1
 Wallace's Lecture* and Etaayt on Natural Theology and Ethict, p.
169. Prof. Wallace adds that "it is an aim not, indeed) probably to be
reached by what in their sense is called the ' socialisation' of the ineanx
of production ".
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ment falls only upon ordinary Socialism which seeks to
achieve an onspiritoal end by anspiritual means : and, more-
over, Mr. Bosanquet might say that he is only dealing with
preliminaries aud principles, and that the defectiveness of
any particular State is not part of the question. Still, a
philosopher who approaches his subject from the point of
view of pure theory, is as much liable to a bias as those who
approach it with a more practical aim, and the theoretical
bias can hardly fail to give a certain twist to the argument.
A philosopher certainly does valuable service if he can bring
home to his fellow-citizens all that the State, the highest
human achievement, really is; for to ordinary consciousness
the State is a mere matter of course, if nothing worse. To
Mr. Bosanquet, ae to Hobbes, ' an actual living society is an
infinitely higher creature than a steam-engine, plant or
animal': but the enthusiasm of the philosophical analyst for
his object may tend to idealise the actual in the wrong way
or in a way not intended. The object of political philosophy,
says Mr. Bosanquet (after Hegel), is merely to understand
what a State ' is '; and for this purpose it is not necessary
that the State which is analysed should be "ideal," it is
sufficient that it should be a State at all; just as the nature
of life is represented pretty nearly as well by one living man
as by another. Is this quite a real or proper analogy ? Is
the State a merely natural fact of which it is sufficient to
know that it answers to its idea ? Is not Mr. Bosanquet's
analysis of the State really governed by an ideal conception,
suggested but not fully given by the actual—by a conception
of the complete possibilities and purposes of distinctively
human life : and, if that is so, does not the argument itself
demand that more stress should be laid on the partial
character of the reabsation of the ideal attained by any actual
community? It seems, in other words, to be as much a
part of the idealist argument to.insist that the actual is not
the ideal, as it is to insist that the ideal is not reached by
abstraction from the actual.1 A modern State may be as
'perfect' a State as any other for purposes of analysis, but
if, as Mr. Bosanquet finely puts it, the State is ' a working
conception of life —if so far any State is better than no State,
since it is the State alone that can secure the possibilities of
good life—then the argument admits of the turn which Plato
and Rousseau gave to it; for it was juBt this idea that con-
stituted the element of revolt in both. It is, no doubt, true
•This teems to be the point of the difficult passage in Plato's Republic,
p. 501, a, b.
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that'their sense of the discord between the actual and ideal
ended in making them 'not ideal- enough': both seem at
times to lose their faith in human • nature;rand to sink to a-
lowe'r level.'-sd that we^feel'we hav'eJtO' turn:to Aristotle,-for>
instance, for the "moire purely ideal;" because'the more purely
'theoretic',' treatmerit-of the 8tate and its institutions. "'But
for £11 that Tarn not'sure'that the understanding of the re-
lation of'politics -to human nature does not go" deeper in Plato
and Rousseau than-* in'Aristotle-and 'Hegel, and that the note
of^cynicism "and of revolt was not more truly philosophical
than'the note of ideal''*acceptftnce. It is at 'any rate signi-
ficant that Aristotler was idealising -the Greek -State at the
moment when it had' ceased to be a working conception of
life. It may be'ultimately a matter of-temperament :• still,
with all his wonderful understanding of' ' what, is,' there is
after all a certain pedantry about Hegel's theory of'the
State ;"its ' logic'is undeniable, but" there is perhaps1 a deeper
logic than the'logic "of the philosophical(" looker-on'•'. ' I
would even hazard an-opinion that, with'all. their imperfect
logic, Bentham and Mill have done'more toi humanise politics
than Hegel's philosophy of the' State,~profound «nd in a sense
ultimate as'it is. The question, of course,'arises in other
forms ;-'but the general"tendency of the1 Hegelian* method' is
to bid pe6ple:8eek 'the^ideal in the actual '(cp. • for' instance
Bradley's'essay on "My Station and Duties")^a wholesome
but not a Whole truth.' This was 'not after all the method
of thle Greek1 thinkers to whom.-Mr.. Bosanquet'refers us-: to
Plato' and to Aristotle'the • science'of-human life'was not
merely theoretical bufpractical :3and'however philosophically '
precarious it"may •be-to' a^pfoach'the^'problem' of-the'State
from' the •si'de" of practical 'or'semi-practical ^ 'aims, I am "in-
clined' to'think';ithat;'thir8-1may be""1 the treason why'Green's
Leclwrei'on Political •Obligation'produce- oh 'the'reader' a greater
impression~'oi J^ctu'ality'''than''Mr.''Bo8a'nqu'et 's^ Philosophical
Theory ^ df^the'^State, though" as^ aT purely ^phildsophi'cal and
intellectual 'effort Mr?"Bos'anquet's* book' might 'almost be
c o n s i d e r e d f a tour"de-/dr<:e:. "-•'>• ' * " . ' £ ' ' 12 • } • * . ' ^' ,
Oh, this account"I am.disposed tb-"think*that if"Green's
; pe'sijimism"'''!is a'-Half-'trrith.X'Mrri-BosanqueVs'optimism is
a' ljalf-'tfu'th"' alsd! and^on7fithe^wlible''Uhe£more - deceptive;
Tkere i^.B/'" almost - ^ oo^ mu'fifi'^  meth"od'li-in^r3{Ir'.5rBosanquet's
wisdom,/*or-perhapVtdo;rnuch "sheer*'intellectuality of view':
it1 is well'-to see'life^as S whole,-and'to" find -the ideal" every^
where, but is it not also just a little academic ? I do not
know. .that,iany,isocial(treform.er/jwjio,,belieye8 cin.the. reality
and possibilities of character would deny the facts which1,7 ag
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Mr. Bosanquet says, " seem to sbow the essentials of, life to
be far more identical .throughout the scHcalled . classes of
society"' than-is admitted: by the passage which he cites
from Green about ".the untaught and underfed denizen of
a London yard with "gin shops on the right hand and on
the .left". Mr. Bosanquet speaks here with more than
theoretic authority ; but I am not sure that' the facts on
which ;he relies quite bear out '.' .the . conviction .that the
time has gone by for the scrupulous caution-Vhich Green
displayed in estimating the value of. the State to its mem-
bers," though they certainly draw attention to the side of
the trath which is• most liable to be>neglected or forgotten
by social.and political reformers/ .-• -
But it is, as I have said, mainly a. matter of emphasis : I
freely admit that .Mr. Bosanquet's theory is broad and deep
enough to include all that is valuable in the Eughsh, thinkers
whom he criticises. • • • > . . . . . . • . ' .
. The other reason Mr. Bosanquet giveR for a new work on
the same lines as Green lies in. the " attempt to apply the
conceptions of recent psychology to the theory of State
coercion and of the Beal or General. Will, and to explain
the relatjon of Social Philosophy to Sociological Psycho-
logy ". It is this motive which constitutes the special
novelty and originality of, Mr.. Bosanquet's .Philosophical
Theory of the State, and .brings it into touch with the current
movement in: Sociology..: . , . .. / ^
- I have already;indicated the point of the,criticism which
Mr. BoBanquet,passes upon Sociological psychology.. 'Mr.
Bosanquet says of psychological sociologists pretty.)much
what Plato and Aristotle say tof the ancient^ph'ysicist's dis-
covery of ' mind ' in nature : Anaxagoras;. they1 complained
in. effect, had spoken a great word, but failed_to> realise it.
The psychological sociologists in the same way have not
made the most of. their clue :, they have found the .key, but
put it in the wrong side uppermost: they^ work: with/'/asso-
ciation " . when ;.they.mightV work with " apperception<".
Society, no more than' the! individual mind, can be • under-
stood apart from the idea of system ;<it doesinot, therefore,
•depend upon the imitation of- one mind by'-,another^' but
upon the action of adapted differences within a social whole.
The working, ideas, of Sociology .should be those of function,
•structure and organisation—of a true identity in difference,
not-a mere contagion of similars. If you are going "to
explain society. in" terms of- mind,, you^must'at' any'rate'take
.mind where it' is most", not where it. is least, mind, \ any casual
association of psychical units no more explains the structure
11
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and working of a mind than any mere association of human
units explains the structure and working of a State. All
current theories, however, of the relation between the indi-
vidual and society treat it as a relation between individuals
and others rather than a relation of individuals to individuals
within a whole. It is just the organisation of purposes .which
the State embodies that these theories fail to explain : the
mere individual points beyond himself in order to become
a true individual: he ' finds' himself in that form of co-
operative life we call the State.
The way in which Mr. Bosanquet (and' I may add Mrs.
Bosanquet, cp. The Standard of Life) brings the doctrine of
apperception to bear upon the problem of society and social
Frogress is certainly very interesting and suggestive: audam bound to say that his criticism of the inadequacy of
the categories which psychological sociologists have employed
seems to be decisive, so long as we reduce the idea of Imita-
tion and the like to their lowest terms. But as a matter of
fact many of these theorists, as already suggested, would
deny that they mean by Imitation * precisely what they ought
to mean, or give it quite the range of explanation assumed
in the criticism. That ideas and practices are propagated
in human society by means of ' imitation' is not less true
because it is not the way in which, say, a committee adjusts
its ideas: it is not even a truism, but a truth, the impor-
tance of which is worth consideration : it is a, if it is not the,
social phenomenon. It is conceivable that an investigation
of the conditions of ' imitatdveness,' on the one hand, and
' instability ' on.the other, might yield results of importance
to the legislator and to the reformer quite apart from the
light that it might throw upon social events and processes.
If the working of ' Imitation' and ' Invention are not
sufficient explanations of social progress, a good many
theories of social development have gone astray through
neglect of some of the facts which they cover, as M. Tarde,
for instance, shows in bis pertinent criticisms of Coulange's
La GiU antique and Loria's Let Bases economiques ds la Consti-
tution soeiale (Transformation du Pouvoir). On the other hand,
M. Tarde explicitly maintains that the relation between two
1 1 suspect that Imitation is part of a wider psychological fact—the
tendency in human nature to porsne the least line of resistance or to
reach things by the shortest route. Such a tendenoy is of immense
gignrfloanofi in intellectual matters: i-q. the treatment of indiutrial co-
operation is simply passed on from text-book to text-book till yon reaoh a
non-imitative treatment in Mrs. Webb's study of the co-operative move-
ment
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peraons, one of whom exercises a mental influence upon the
other, is the one essential element in the social life, and that
" it always consists, at bottom, in an imitation of one by the
other ".* It is certainly difficult, as already observed, to see
how this explains the kind of co-operation, based upon re-
ciprocal differences,' which social hie implies, and it by no
means follows that the relation of the child to the adult—
which is, by the way, not wholly imitative—is typical of
the social relation aa such : which suggests that the genetic
method adopted by Prof. Baldwin is of doubtful validity.
It is at any rate doubtful whether the kind of consciousness
on which society depends is simply an extension of the pro-
cess by which the child arrives at the consciousness of ' self'
*nd ' others'.
Mr. Bosanquet extends his criticism in a way which sug-
gests doubts as to any ' explanation' of society or the State
being within the reach of psychology as such. He compares
the relation between psychology and logic: psychology in-
vestigates mental events simply as events without any
reference to their meaning or value, or their relation to
reality: logic studies mental events only so far as they enter
into or become knowledge. In the same way, psychological
sociology and social philosophy approach their subject-matter
from different points of view: the one treats it as an object
of empirical or natural science, the other as exhibiting dif-
ferent degrees of value or reality. In other words, the point
of view of Social Philosophy is teleological: what creates a
State (from this point of view) is the idea or purpose which
makes it what it is: and this idea or purpose is to be found
in its relation to the development of human nature. The
«ssence of the State, therefore, as Plato and Aristotle put it,
lies in the way it serves and expresses ' the soul' of man,
and enables it to live at its best. Mr. Bosanquet, however,
seems to suggest that the better the psychology—or rather the
higher the mind that it attends to—the narrower is the golf
between psychological Sociology and social philosophy. In
other words, he seems to imply that the preliminary abstrac-
tion, from reality which constitutes psychology as a positive
and impartial science shows itself to be too narrow for a
science of mind as such. The distinction between the two
points of view may, however, be maintained with advantage
to both. "Philosophy gives a significance to sociology;
sociology vitalises philosophy" (p. 61). In this way, Mr.
Bosanquet would adjust the 'science' and the 'philosophy'
of society: the method of Gomte and the method of Hegel.
1
 Social Laics, p. 89.
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I confess I am somewhat sceptical as to the precise "value
of the psychological Sociology in vogue. No one can deny
that the philosophical method- (of which. Mr. Bosanquet's
book -is such a nne example) has produced results of per-
manent value: it really fulfils its object of understanding
what a State is, and it is able to suggest principles of guid-
ance as well as standards of value. ' But the attempt to
resolve the phenomena of society into some such mental
process as 'Imitation,' or into some such original and ele-
mentary subjective fact as ' consciousness of kind' seems to
be neither science nor philosophy. .If we are going to inter-
pret society in terms of mind, then we must be able to exhibit,
as Hegel does, stages of mind:'we must be able to show
the place of social relations in the growth of mind. Hegel's
conception of history as the gradual reahsation of Freedom
is one thing, but the representation of social evolution as
determined by a consciousness of kind is another. " So long
as sociological method simply stands for wholeness of view
—as against the abstractions of this or that branch of social
science—or so long as it stands for the introduction of a
scientific method into the consideration of human affairs,
it supplies a regulative idea of no little value. The position
of Sociology as thus conceived might perhaps be compared
to the position of philosophy in relation to the special sciences.
It is important to vindicate a sphere for philosophy as apart
from the sciences; but as soon as this is done, the tempta-
tion arises to treat philosophy itself as a definite science.
We must then ask what is its subject-matter,- and must
suppose this subject-matter to have as fixed and definite a
character as, say, the subject-matter of chemistry; whereas
this is just what is not true of the subject matter of philosophy.
There is no subject-matter of philosophy in the same fixed
and definite sense as oxygen is of chemistry. Eather, philo-
sophy is a spirit which should animate all special sciences
and hold up an ideal of science never realised, because
always progressive. We may say much the same about the
position of Sociology: Sociology is regulative rather than
constitutive of social science : directly we treat it as a special
science, we try to find for it a- subject-matter of its own
which is either no subject-matter, or is simply the minimum
of form required to constitute a social fact. It is pretty
much in the same way that a science has been made of
' Fonnal Logic'. Sociology, as, for instance, it is represented
by Prof Giddings, seems to me dangerously akin to a pseudo-
science—neither light-giving nor fruit-bearing. To my mind
' Sociology represents an ideal, and an ideal which stultifies
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itself when it is metamorphosed into a science with a pro-
vince and a subject-matter " as definite as that of any other
science". It must, moreover, be regarded as dealing ultimately
with ' norms'—as a normative science. As Mr. Bosanguet
observes, Sociology in becoming psychological has not given
op its positive standpoint: it has no means, therefore, of
applying standards of value to this or that form of social
organisation: its interest seems to chiefly lie in finding the
minimum which goes to make a society. But the difficulty
of maintaining an indifferent or positive attitude towards
social phenomena is seen in the actual teleological tendency
of sociology itself. Prof. Giddings no more than Comte can
help introducing elements of valuation into his interpretation
of society: both really value the process of social evolution
for what it brings out, that is, for the quality of human life
it produces. If society is " an organisation for the develop-
ment of humanity " (and not merely consciousness of kind),
what becomes of " the definition of sociology as an explana-
tion of social phenomena in terms of natural causation," or
indeed of its claim to be an ' explanatory' science at all ?
The conception of " a science that tries to conceive of society
as a unity,'and attempts to explain it in terms of cosmic
cause and law " is certainly grand enough, but is it not also
a little crude? And is it not getting the ' scientific' treatment
of society on rather cheap and easy terms? Any how, a
careful study of professedly sociological literature, interesting
and suggestive as it often is, has only confirmed my convic-
tion that Sociology has still got to make good its scientific
pretensions, and more especially its claim to absorb ethics
and economics—to say nothing of other studies.
At the same time I do not wish to deny that the psychology
of what may be called the social mind does not open up a
fruitful field of inquiry. The literature of ' suggestion ' and
the social value of suggestion has, as Prof. Baldwin observes,
given to social psychology " its most respectable showing" :
but it has also been responsible for " very crude and unphilo-
sophical" theories of social association, as the same writer
shows in his criticism of the theory of ' Mob-Action'.
Prof. Baldwin's own contribution to the study of social
psychology is certainly not wanting in an appreciation of the
fact to be explained (cp., eu/., the criticism just referred to, and
the distinction drawn between ' companies' and 'societies');
but owing partly to his terminology and partly to his method,
I find it difficult to get a distinct or consistent view of his
position. It is clear that the mental development of a child
is from the nature of the case hypothetical at the best, and
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any interpretation we may give of it most partake of con-
jecture. Moreover, the starting-point of individualistic
psychology is itself an abstraction; which is liable to pass
into the assumption that the individual mind is there to begin
with. The result is that a bridge has to be constructed from
the individual to the social unit. This bridge is the imitative
process, and thus we get an exaggerated stress laid upon the
phenomenon of social sensitiveness and suggestibility in the
development of the moral and social individual. But the
mind is after all what it experiences, and none of its experi-
ence can be treated as foreign to any nature it has of its own.
Prof. Baldwin's account of the genesis of the social conscious-
ness invites comparison with Hegel. Prof. Baldwin indeed
criticises Hegel for neglecting psychological explanation, but,
as Prof. Royce rather quaintly remarks, Hegel was " not
interested in individual psychology ". He would, indeed, have
regarded it as an impossible abstraction: like Plato, he
held that the soul must be studied in the larger letters,
that is, in the institutions in which the characteristic forces
of the soul are embodied. Apart from society the human
individual could not develop the germ of conscience or
intelligence that he has in him as a self-conscious being:
he could not even arrive at the consciousness of ' self,'
(except in the sense in which self-consciousness might be
produced through any experience of a not-self). So far I
presume Prof. Baldwin and Hegel would be agreed : but in
his anxiety to describe the psychological process by which
the individual becomes a social and a moral being, Prof.
Baldwin is led to seek its whole origin in " at give-and-take
between the individual and his fellows ". But is this really
the essence of the process by which the individual reaches
the recognition of a moral order of life, as revealed not only
in the behaviour of persons but in social custom and institu-
tion ? The moral and social intelligence as such is not a de-
velopment of " the function of imitation " ; unless imitation is
to be used in the sense in which Plato describes moral edu-
cation as a process of training the power of the soul to
' imitate' or ' assimilate,' through the various influences of
personal example, of art, and of noble surroundings, a plan
and order of life. The process of moral habituation involves
a good deal more than a process of imitation.
But, apart from any reference to Hegel, does Prof. Bald-
win's method explain the genesis of the distinctively moral
consciousness ? He seems to regard the moral sense as a
function of the thought of ' self' as compared with ' others'.
But it is difficult to see how the mere consciousness of ' self'
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and • others' contains the germ of a moral relation. The
relation between ' self' and ' others' can only become moral
through a third idea—and that is the idea of morality itself.
Granted that the ethical sentiment is occasioned or made
active through the relation of self to others, there is nothing
in that relation which contains the idea, still less the ground
of a right relation. The individual, again, " learns his ethical
lessons from society " : but all the lessons of society are not
equally good ' copy'. What is to direct the choice or discrimi-
nation of the child ? It is, we are told, " the child's imitative
growth into a sense of ideal personality " which provides him
with a standard of social values; and Prof. Baldwin endeavours
to show that not only the sense of self, but the sense of a
moral and ideal self, is developed in the individual by ' imita-
tion ' and ' imitative obedience'. There is the self of ' habit'
and there is the self of ' accommodation,' upon which super-
venes the " self that fulfils law " : " we do right by habitually
imitating (note the sense of imitation) a larger self whose
injunctions run counter to the tendencies of our partial delves ".
The psychogenesis of the ethical sentiment as described by
Prof. Baldwin is interesting enough; but just so far as he
seeks the origin of morality in the play of imitation between
individuals, he seems to make the idea of obligation in the
end something merely subjective—an impression which is
confirmed by a reference to the affinity of his view with that of
Guyau. The ' sense' of obligation may be " the sense of
the lack of unity in the highest region of moter-function " :
but is there no difference between the feeling and the fact of
obligation ? Both the nature and the growth of the moral
sense seem to be much more complex than Prof. Baldwin's
account suggests: he has shown that ' we begin our public
affections in our families,' but his account of what is involved
in moral understanding, or in its development, seems hardly
adequate. Morality is after all not a mere psychological
process: it depends upon a capacity for moral ideas, a capacity
which makes demand upon every ' psychological' instinct—
not merely the instinct of ' imitation '—and, if it is developed
largely through the play of imitation between individuals, it
reBts in the last resort on the growing recognition of an
order or system of life which we do not make, which is
greater than ourselves/ and yet is what we ourselves most
desire. The formation of such a point of view involves other
agencies than imitation, as Plato showed in his account of
moral habituation ; moreover, it is the actualisation of some
deeper potentiality than the tendency to ' assimilate copy'.
Such a potentiality can only be described as what Plato and
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168 SYDNEY BALL :
Aristotle called ' Reason,' Hegel called ' Mind' or ' Spirit':
but for the ' prior' nature of Reason or Mind, no such psycho-
logical experience as Prof. Baldwin describes could possibly
give rise to moral ideas: there must be working through it
all a principle, which we may not call a distinctively moral
principle, bat a principle which makes morality possible, and
which when developed takes the shape of explicit moral ideas :
and the experience itself is not simply the experience that
arises out of the relation between individual persons.
The question which Prof. Baldwiu really raises is whether
the ' whole origin ' not only of the thought of ' self,' but of
the thought of an ' ideal self' is ' from persons '. Is it true
to say—apart from society, no conscience? Apart from
society and social experience there would be little or no
content for conscience, but the condition of the possibility
of conscience can only be found in an inner feeling of self-
affirmation which is at once the root of morality and the
source of self-judgment. The feeling that you have failed
to affirm or assert yourself, which as far as one can see
any kind of failure in action might produce, lies at the basis
of self-approval and the reverse ; it is not created by, though
it is made active by, the lines of action ' suggested ' to the
social self. Does imitation, again, give a sufficient account
of the genesis of an ideal self ? It is true that we first seem
to see types of excellence or perfection in some person or
persons, but this does not warrant the conclusion that imi-
tation of one person by another is the process by which the
individual comes to identify himself with an ideal type of
human perfection. Prof. Baldwin, in fact, seems to treat
the occasion of moral development as if it were the ground,
or the ' origin '. Moreover, even if the method could account
for moral beliefs or predilections, it does not suggest any
guarantee for their truth, or their relation to reality. Moral-
ity seems to involve not only the sense of a general will, but
of its reality.
In spite, therefore, of the very interesting and suggestive
treatment of moral psychology by Prof. Baldwin, I venture
to think that no merely psychological account of morality
can satisfy the requirements of theory. I also venture to
doubt whether the points of view of psychology and philo-
sophy can be fused without being confused. Mr. Bosanquet
seems to suggest that in its highest range of explanation—
in its explanation of the logical mind or of ' the mind where
it is most mind '—psychology and philosophy tend to meet.
I am inclined to think that it is more important to emphasise
the division of labour. The more empirical psychology
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remains—the more it tries to reduce conceptions to the de-
finite psychological facts to which they correspond—the better
for philosophy. Take, for instance, Mr. Bosanquet's own
account of mental organisation : regarded as a psychological
account it seems to suffer from the converse defect to the
' association ' theory with which it is contrasted : it is really
too philosophical to be strictly psychological: as a regulative
idea or point of view it is no doubt valuable, but, if1 it is to
be taken as a description of definite psychical facts or of
what strictly 'happens,' it must be described as obscure.
It would, however, take me beyoud my immediate subject
to raise the questions involved in the relation of empirical
to speculative psychology, or of psychology generally to
fundamental philosophy. Whether psychology should ab-
sorb philosophy or vice vend, or whether they are only
working from different ends of the tunnel, does not seem
to be a matter of great importance : for in any case the
distinction between the points of view remains, and, how-
ever much they may run into one another, their centres of
interest are different. There will always remain a field
(however indeterminate) for psychology as a positive and
empirical study, and there will always be a demand for the
criticism of philosophy. The present situation in sociology
is, mutatis mutandis, an illustration of both propositions, but
of the latter perhaps more than the former ; and it is not the
least distinction of Mr. Bosanquet's book that he has brought
within our view two apparently independent traditions of
social science—that of psychological sociology, as the last
result of the positive method, on the one hand, and that of
social philosophy as represented by Plato and Aristotle and
their idealist successors, such as Rousseau and Hegel, on the
other.
There is one point, however, on which modern sociologists
and social philosophers seem to join hands, and that is the
rejection of " economic sociology"—a type of which Marx
and Loria are the dominant representatives. Here, again,
the philosophical as also the psychological criticism of an
abstraction is logically justified : but, as in the case of the
reaction against the biological method, the critics tend to
fall into an opposite abstraction (and to forget that an ab-
straction, if not the whole, may be none the less a genuine
side of reality). The action of economic interests and mo-
tives is almost a neglected element in a good deal of current
Sociology. Prof. Giddings, for instance, seems content to
observe that economic activity is a form of human desire,
and economics is therefore dependent on Sociology in the
1 2
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sense that the desires which the economist " takes as he
finds them " can only be explained in the light of " the evolu-
tion and ultimate causation of desire in general" . But it
is hard to find any such explanation or derivation of the
economic activities, and of the social relations to which they
give rise, in Prof. Gidding's theory of social forces : certainly
" consciousness of kind " and of " similarity " is not specially
helpful to a student of economic forces. Sociology, we are
told in a recent work by the same author, " can render no
greater political service than to show that like-mindedness
is the absolutely essential condition of social cohesion and
of the efficiency of any social organisation". But "like-
mindedness " by itself certainly does not contain the essence
either of specifically political (as distinguished from merely
social) or of specifically economic forces. The purely abstract
and formal character of sociological reasoning as such could
hardly- be better illustrated than by the incapacity of its
" first principle " to account for the subject matter of either
politics or economics. It may be said generally of any
' Sociology' that thrusts economic forces into the back-
ground, that it is neglecting the field in which the ' positive'
science of society has really made any assured ground at all.
The criticisms passed on the one-sidedness of the economic
interpretation of history by Mr. Bosanquet and Prof. Barth
are exceedingly pertinent: but they are really directed against
the tendency of the economic school of sociologists to explain
social causation in material rather than ideal terms. Still,
the economic ' abstraction' is, in its turn, a wholesome
corrective of the ' ideological' abstraction : and it so happens
that both points of view were recognised by Saint Simon,
the pioneer at once of Sociology and Socialism. As Prof.
Wallace says of Socialism generally, Economic Sociology had
its origin as a part of the general protest that has been raised
in the realistic interest against a fantastic and unsubstantial
idealism or spiritualism or intellectualism. But Economic
Sociology as such (like all Sociology as such) aims at a unity
of view which it can only attain by what looks like unity,
but what is really mere simplicity of view; and Economic
Sociology can only exalt itself by humbling itself, that is by
being content to be scientific: and it can only be scientific
by the method of special and definite investigation. The
analysis and history of a national industrial system, conducted
with due reference to the social and intellectual evolution of
which it forms a part, opens up one among many fruitful
fields of sociological study. Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webbs
studies in Trade Unionism, and Mr. Charles Booth's in-
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vestigations into life and labour in London, are suggestive
types and examples of a positive and a realistic study of social
structure. The work to be done is so vast in extent that it
requires organisation and division of labour: it also requires
the control of philosophy, or of "thinking thingB together".
It seems a matter of indifference whether you give the title
of ' Sociology ' or of ' Social Philosophy' to the general plan
of such studies: the one suggests the more positive, the
other the more teleological aspect of social science.1 The
main thing is that Sociology, so far as it claims to be an
application of the scientific spirit to social and political pro-
blems, must be prepared to ' imitate' the ' infinite patience'
of science. It is only in this way that we can build up from
below the foundations of that Sovereignty of Knowledge to
which Comte, like Plato, looked for the reorganisation of
social and individual life. It is only to this kind of sociological
study, undertaken in a serious and scientific spirit, and con-
trolled by " the idea of the good," that we must look for the
progressive realisation of " the sociological idea ".
1
 The sort of t^hifr" that prevails in the points of view is symbolised
by the institution of the two separate "schools" of "Political and
Economic Science," and of "Ethical and Social Philosophy," recently
established in London. In either school the 'other' point of view is
likely to fall short.
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